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Abstract
Feature-sensitive verification is a recent field that pursues the effective analysis of the exponential number of
variants of a program family. Today researchers lack examples of concrete bugs induced by variability, and occurring
in real large-scale software. Such a collection of bugs is a requirement for goal-oriented research, serving to evaluate
tool implementations of feature-sensitive analyses by testing them on real bugs. We present a qualitative study of
40 variability bugs collected from bug-fixing commits to the Linux kernel repository. We investigate each of the 40
bugs, recording the outcome of our analysis into a database. In addition, we provide self-contained simplified C99
versions of the bugs, facilitating understanding and tool evaluation. Our study provides insights about the nature and
occurrence of variability bugs in a large C software system, and shows in what ways variability affects and increases
the complexity of software bugs.
1 Introduction
Many software systems today have to support a large amount of variability. In some systems, like the Linux kernel,
configuration options, here referred as features [20], are used to tailor functional and non-functional properties to the
needs of a particular user. In systems adopting the Software Product Line methodology [1] selection of features is used
to tailor production of an individual software product for a particular market niche. Highly configurable systems can get
very large, and can encompass large amounts of features. Reports of industrial systems with thousands of features are
known [4] and open-source examples of similar size have been documented in detail [5].
Different features in a configurable system interact in non-trivial ways, because they need to influence each others
functionality. When such interactions are unintended, they induce bugs that manifest themselves in certain configurations
but not in others, or that manifest differently in different configurations. A bug in an individual configuration can be
found by analyzers based on standard program analysis techniques like type-checking, model checking or static analysis.
However, since the number of configurations is exorbitant (exponential in the number of features) it is not feasible to
analyze each of these configurations separately.
Family-based [32], a form of feature-sensitivity, analyses tackle this problem by considering all configurable
program variants as a single unit of analysis, instead of analyzing the individual variants separately. In order to avoid
duplication of effort, common parts are analyzed once and the analysis forks only at differences between variants.
Recently, various family-based extensions to classic analysis techniques have been developed, including techniques
based on well-formedness checking [14], type checking [2, 22], dataflow analysis [9, 6], model checking [3, 13, 12, 17],
and bounded model checking of software [29].
Most of the research so far has focused on the inherent scalability problem. However, we still lack evidence that
these extensions are adequate for specific purposes in real-world scenarios. In particular, little effort has been put into
understanding what kind of bugs appear in highly configurable systems, and what are their variability characteristics.
Gaining such understanding would help to ground research on family-based analyses in actual problems.
The understanding of complexity of variability bugs is not common among practitioners and in available artifacts.
While bug reports abound, there is little knowledge on what of those bugs are caused by feature interactions. Very
often, as a result of the complexities of a large project like Linux, developers are not entirely conscious of the features
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that affect the software they work on. Also, having no feature-sensitive tool support, getting this information requires
strenuous manual navigation of the source code. As a result, few bug reports clearly identify the affected configuration.
The objective of this work is to understand the complexity and nature of variability bugs (including feature
interaction bugs) occurring in a large highly-configurable system, the Linux kernel. We address this objective via a
qualitative in-depth analysis and documentation of forty cases of such bugs. We make the following contributions:
• Identification of 40 variability bugs in the Linux kernel, including in-depth analysis and presentation for non-
experts.
• A database containing the results of our analysis, encompassing a detailed data record about each bug. These
bugs comprise common types of errors in C software, and cover different types of feature interactions. We intend
to grow the collection in the future with the help of the research community. The current version is available at
http://VBDb.itu.dk.
• Self-contained simplified C99 versions of all bugs. These ease comprehension of the underlying causes, and can
be used for testing bug-finders in a smaller scale.
• An aggregated reflection over the collection of bugs. Providing insight on the nature of bugs induced by feature
interactions in a large project like Linux.
We adopt a qualitative manual methodology of analysis (supported by tools only for smaller tasks)—a choice motivated
by three reasons. First, family-based automated analysis tools that scale for the Linux kernel do not exist. In fact,
without this qualitative analysis it was unclear what tools should be built. Second, using conventional (not family-based)
analysis tools on individual variants after preprocessing does not scale (if applied exhaustively) or yields low probability
of finding bugs (if applied by random sampling). Also, it is inherently difficult to map errors in variants back to their
variational program origins. Third, perhaps most important, searching for bugs with tools only allows to find cases that
these tools cover, while we were interested in exploring the nature of variability bugs widely.
Reflecting on the collected material, we learn that variability bugs are very complex, they involve many aspects of
programming language semantics, they are distributed in most parts of Linux project, involve multiple features and
span code in remote locations. Detecting these bugs is difficult for both people and tools. Once family-based analyses
able to capture these bugs are available, it will be interesting to conduct extensive quantitative experiments to confirm
our qualitative intuitions.
We direct our work to designers of program analysis and bug finding tools. We believe that the collection of bugs
can inspire them in several ways: (i) it will provide a set of concrete, well described challenges for analyses, (ii) it will
serve as a benchmark for evaluating their tools, and (iii) it will dramatically speed up design of new techniques, since
they can be tried on simplified Linux-independent bugs. Using realistic bugs from a large piece of software in evaluation
can aid tuning the analysis precision, and incite designers to support certain language constructs in the analysis.
The paper proceeds with presenting background on software bugs and variability in Sect. 2. The methodology of
the study is presented in Sect. 3. Sections 4–5 describe the analysis in detail: first the considered dimensions, then
the aggregate observations. We finish surveying threats to validity (Sect. 6), related work (Sect. 7) and a conclusion
(Sect. 8).
2 Background
We use the term software bug to refer to both faults and errors as defined by IEEE Standard Glossary of Software
Engineering [31]. A fault is an incorrect instruction in the software, introduced into the code as a result of a human
mistake. Faults induce errors, that are incorrect program states, such as a pointer being null when it should not be.
Errors may cause the software to fail or behave incorrectly. In this work we collected bugs (errors) that had manifested
as failures during execution (typically resulting in a kernel panic), as well as defects (faults) that were spotted by the
compiler when building a specific kernel configuration. While the latter might look harmless (for instance an unused
variable) we assume that they might be side-effects of serious misconceptions potentially leading to other bugs.
A feature is a unit of functionality additional to the core software [11]. The core (base variant) implements the basic
functionality present in any variant of a program family. The different selections of features (configurations) define
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1 void foo(int a) { →(5)
•2 printf("%d\n",2/a); // ERROR (6)×
3 }
•4 int main(void) { // START ⇒(1)
5 int x = 1; (2)
6 #ifdef CONFIG_INCR // NO |
7 x = x + 1; |
8 #endif |
9 #ifdef CONFIG_DECR // YES ↓
10 x = x - 1; (3)
11 #endif ↓
12 foo(x); (4)→
13 }
Figure 1: Example of a program family and a variability bug.
the set of program variants. Often, two features cannot be simultaneously enabled, or one feature requires enabling
another. Feature dependencies are specified using a feature model [20] (or a decision model [18]), denoted here by ψFM;
effectively a constraint over features defining legal configurations.
Preprocessor-based program families [21] associate features with macro symbols, and define their implementations
as statically conditional code guarded by constraints over feature symbols. The macro symbols associated to features
(configuration options) are often subject to naming conventions, for instance, in Linux these identifiers shall be prefixed
by CONFIG_. We follow the Linux convention through out this paper. Figure 1 presents a tiny preprocessor-based C
program family using two features, INCR and DECR. Statements at lines 7 and 10 are conditionally present. Assuming
an unrestricted feature model ψFM = true, the figure defines a family of four different variants.
A presence condition ϕ of a code fragment is a minimal (by the number of referred variables) Boolean formula over
features, specifying the subset of configurations in which the code is included in the compilation. A code fragment
with presence condition ϕ is thus present in a configuration κ iff κ  ϕ. The concept of presence condition extends
naturally to other entities; for instance, a presence condition for a bug specifies the subset of configurations in which a
bug occurs. Concrete configurations, denoted by κ, can also be written as Boolean constraints—conjunctions of feature
literals. As an example, consider the decrement statement in l. 10, which has presence condition DECR, thus it is part of
configurations κ0 = ¬INCR ∧ DECR and κ1 = INCR ∧ DECR.
Features can influence the functions offered by other features—a phenomenon known as feature interaction, which
can be either intentional or unexpected. In our example, the two features interact because both modify and use the same
program variable x. Enabling either INCR or DECR, or both, results in different values of x prior to calling foo.
As a result of variability, bugs can occur in some configurations but not in others, and can also manifest different
failures in different variants. If a bug occurs in one or more configurations, and does not occur in at least one other
configuration, we call it a variability bug. Figure 1 shows how one of the program variants in our example family,
namely κ0, will crash at line 2 when we attempt to divide by zero. Because this bug is not manifested in any other
variant, it is a variability bug—with presence condition ¬INCR ∧ DECR.
Program family implementations are usually conceptually stratified in three layers: the problem space (typically
a feature model), a solution space implementation (for instance C code), and the mapping between the problem and
solution spaces (build system and the preprocessor in Linux). We show how the division-by-zero bug could be fixed
(depending on the interpretation) in our running example, in each layer separately.
Fix in code. If function foo should accept any int value, then the bug is fixed by appropriately handling zero as input.
2 printf("%d\n",2/a); ⇒
2 if (a != 0)
3 printf("%d\n",2/a);
4 else
5 printf("NaN\n");
Fix in mapping. If we assume that function foo shall not be called with a zero argument, a possible fix is to decrement
x only when both DECR and INCR are enabled.
9 #ifdef CONFIG_DECR
10 x = x - 1;
11 #endif
⇒
9 #ifdef CONFIG_DECR && CONFIG_INCR
10 x = x - 1;
11 #endif
3
Fix in model. If the bug is caused by an illegal interaction, we can introduce a dependency in the feature model to
prevent the faulty configuration κ0. For instance, let DECR be only available when INCR is enabled. Assuming feature
model ψFM = DECR→ INCR forbids κ0.
3 Methodology
Objective. Our objective is to qualitatively understand the complexity and nature of variability bugs (including feature-
interaction bugs) occurring in a large highly-configurable system: the Linux kernel. This includes addressing the
following research questions:
• RQ1: Are variability bugs limited to any particular type of bugs, “error-prone” features, or specific location?
• RQ2: In what ways does variability affect software bugs?
Subject. We study the Linux kernel, taking the Linux stable GIT1 repository2 as the unit of analysis. Linux is likely
the largest highly-configurable open-source system. It has about ten million lines of code and more than ten thousand
features. Crucially, data about Linux bugs is available freely. We have free access to the bug tracker3, the source code
and change history4, and to public discussions on the mailing list5 (LKML) and other forums. There also exist books on
Linux development [8, 24]—valuable resources when understanding a bug-fix. Access to domain specific knowledge is
crucial for the qualitative analysis.
We focus on bugs already corrected in commits to the Linux repository. These bugs have been publicly discussed
(usually on LKML) and confirmed as actual bugs by kernel developers, so we minimize the chance of including fictitious
problems. The patches have been reviewed and approved, so the information about the nature of the bug fix is reliable.
Methodology. Our methodology has three parts: first, we identify the variability bugs in the kernel history. Second, we
analyze and explain them. Finally, we reflect on the aggregated material to answer our research questions.
Part 1: Finding Variability Bugs. We have settled on a semi-automated search through Linux commits to find variability
bugs via historic bug fixes. As of April 2014 the Linux repository has over 400, 000 commits, which rules out manual
investigation of each commit. We have thus searched through the commits for variability bugs using the following
steps:
1. Selecting variability-related commits. We retain commits matching regular expressions of Fig. 2. Expressions
in Fig. 2(a) identify commits in which the author’s message relates the commit to specific features. Those in
Fig. 2(b) identify commits introducing changes to the feature mapping or the feature model. We reject merges as
such commits do not carry changes.
2. Selecting bug-fixing commits. We narrow to commits that fix bugs, matching regular expressions that indicate
bugs within the commit message (see Fig. 3).
3. Manual scrutiny. We read the commit message and inspect the changes introduced by the commit to remove
obvious false positives. We order commits by the number of hits in the first two searches, and down prioritize
very complex commits (given the information provided in the commit message and the number of lines modified
by the patch).
Part 2: Analysis. The second part of the methodology is significantly more laborious than the first part. For each
variability bug identified, we carefully analyze the commit message, the patch fix, and the actual code to build an
understanding of the bug. When more context is required, we find and follow the associated LKML discussion. Code
inspection is supported by CTAGS6 and the Unix GREP utility, since we lack feature-sensitive tool support.
1http://git-scm.com/
2https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git
3https://bugzilla.kernel.org/
4http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/
5https://lkml.org/
6http://ctags.sourceforge.net/
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CONFIG_fid
configuration
config option
if fid is [not]? set
when fid is [not]? set
if fid is [en|dis]abled
when fid is [en|dis]abled
(a) Message filters.
#if
#else
#elif
#endif
select fid
config fid
depends on fid
(b) Content filters.
Figure 2: Regular expressions selecting configuration-related commits in: (a) message, (b) content; fid abbreviates
[A-Z0-9_]+, matching feature identifiers.
bug
fix
oops
warn
error
unsafe
invalid
violation
end trace
kernel panic
(a) Generic bug filters.
void *
unused
overflow
undefined
double lock
memory leak
uninitialized
dangling pointer
null [pointer]? dereference
. . .
(b) Specific bug filters.
Figure 3: Regular expressions selecting bug-fixing commits: (a) generic, (b) problem specific
1. The semantics of the bug. For each variability bug we want to understand the cause of the bug, the effect on the
program semantics and the relation between the two. This often requires understanding the inner workings of
the kernel, and translating this understanding to general programming language terms accessible to a broader
audience. As part of this process we try to identify a relevant runtime execution trace and collect links to available
information about the bug online.
2. Variability related properties. We establish what is the presence condition of a bug (precondition in terms of
configuration choices) and where it was fixed (in the code, in the feature model or in the mapping).
3. Simplified version. Last but not least, we condense our understanding in a simplified version of the bug.
We have analyzed 40 Linux bugs following this method and stored the created reports in a publicly available database.
The detailed content of the report is explained in Sect. 4.
Part 3: Data Analysis and Verification. We reflect on the collected data set in order to find answers to our research
questions. This step is supported with some quantitative data but, importantly, we do not make any quantitative
conclusions about the population of the variability bugs in Linux (such conclusions would be unsound given the above
research method). It purely characterizes diversity of the data set obtained. This allows to present the entire collection
of bugs in an aggregated fashion (see Sect. 5).
Finally, in order to reduce bias we confront our method, findings, and hypotheses in an interview with a full-time
professional Linux kernel developer.
4 Dimensions of Analysis
We begin by selecting a number of properties of variability bugs to understand, analyze and document in bug reports.
These are described below and exemplified by data from our database. We show an example record in Fig. 4, a
null-pointer dereference bug found in a driver, which was traced back to errors both in the feature model and the
mapping.
Type of bug (type). In order to understand the diversity of variability bugs we establish the type of bugs according to
the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)7—a catalog of numbered software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We
7http://cwe.mitre.org/
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type: Null pointer dereference
descr: Null pointer on !OF_IRQ gets dereferenced if IRQ_DOMAIN.
In TWL4030 driver, attempt to register an IRQ domain with
a NULL ops structure: ops is de-referenced when registering
an IRQ domain, but this field is only set to a non-null
value when OF_IRQ.
config: TWL4030_CORE && !OF_IRQ
bugfix:
repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git
hash: 6252547b8a7acced581b649af4ebf6d65f63a34b
fix: model, mapping
trace:
. dyn-call drivers/mfd/twl-core.c:1190:twl_probe()
. 1235: irq_domain_add(&domain);
.. call kernel/irq/irqdomain.c:20:irq_domain_add()
... call include/linux/irqdomain.h:74:irq_domain_to_irq()
... ERROR 77: if (d->ops->to_irq)
links: !!md |
* [I2C](http://cateee.net/lkddb/web-lkddb/I2C.html)
* [TWL4030](http://www.ti.com/general/docs/marketurl.tsp?name=twl4030)
* [IRQ domain](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-domain.txt)
(a) Bug record.
1 #include <stdlib.h>
2 #ifdef CONFIG_TWL4030_CORE // YES
3 #define CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN
4 #endif
5 #ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN // YES
6 int irq_domain_simple_ops = 1;
7 void irq_domain_add(int *ops) { →(6)
•8 int irq = *ops; // ERROR (7)×
9 }
10 #endif
11 #ifdef CONFIG_TWL4030_CORE // YES
12 void twl_probe() { →(3)
13 int *ops = NULL; (4)
14 #ifdef CONFIG_OF_IRQ // NO |
15 ops = &irq_domain_simple_ops; |
16 #endif |
17 irq_domain_add(ops); (5)→
18 }
19 #endif
•20 int main(void) { ⇒(1)
21 #ifdef CONFIG_TWL4030_CORE // YES ↓
22 twl_probe(); (2)→
23 #endif
24 return 0;
25 }
(b) Simplified version.
Figure 4: Bug6252547b8a7: a record example and a simplified version.
follow CWE since, it was applied to the Linux kernel before [30]. However, since CWE is mainly concerned with
security, we had to extend it with a few additional types of bugs, including type errors, incorrect uses of Linux APIs,
etc. The types of bugs in the obtained taxonomy are listed in Tbl. 1; our additions lack an identifier in the rightmost
column. The bug types directly indicate what kind of analysis and program verification techniques can be used to
address the bugs identified in the kernel. For instance the category of memory errors (Tbl. 1) maps almost directly to
various program analyses: for null pointers [16, 10, 19], buffer overruns [34, 15, 7], memory leaks [16, 10], etc.
Bug Description (descr). Understanding a bug requires rephrasing its nature in general software engineering terms,
so that the bug becomes understandable for non kernel-experts. We obtain such a description by studying the bug in
depth, and following additional available resources (such as mailing list discussions, available books, commit messages,
documentation and online articles). Whenever use of the Linux terminology is unavoidable, we provide links to the
necessary background. Obtaining the description is often non-trivial. For example, one bug in our database (commit
eb91f1d0a53) was fixed with the following commit message:
Fixes the following warning during bootup when compiling with CONFIG_SLAB:
[ 0.000000] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.000000] WARNING: at kernel/lockdep.c:2282 lockdep_trace_alloc+0x91/0xb9()
[ 0.000000] Hardware name: [ 0.000000] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000] Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.30 #491
[ 0.000000] Call Trace:
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff81087d84>] ? lockdep_trace_alloc+0x91/0xb9
...
It is summarized in our database as:
Warning due to a call to kmalloc() with flags __GFP_WAIT and interrupts enabled
The SLAB allocator is initialized by start_kernel() with interrupts disabled. Later in this process,
setup_cpu_cache() performs the per-CPU kmalloc cache initialization, and will try to allocate
memory for these caches passing the GFP_KERNEL flags. These flags include __GFP_WAIT, which
allows the process to sleep while waiting for memory to be available. Since, as we said, interrupts are
disabled during SLAB initialization, this may lead to a deadlock. If LOCKDEP and other tracing/debugging
options are enabled, the situation is detected and reported as a warning.
We add a one line header to the description, here shown in bold, to help browsing of bugs in the constructed database.
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@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_TWL4030_CORE
-#define CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN
int irq_domain_simple_ops = 1;
@@ -19,7 +15,7 @@
{
int *ops = NULL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_OF_IRQ
+#ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN
ops = &irq_domain_simple_ops;
#endif
Figure 5: Fix for simplified bug6252547b8a7. The patch is given in unified diff format, where a ’+’ prefix indicates
additions and a ’-’ prefix indicates removals.
Program configurations (config). In order to confirm that a bug is indeed a variability bug we investigate under what
presence condition it appears. This allows to rule out bugs that appear unconditionally and enables further investigation
of variability properties of the bug, for example the number of features and nature of dependencies that enable the bug.
Our example bug (Fig. 1) is present when DECR is enabled but INCR is disabled. The Linux bug captured in Fig. 4
requires enabling TWL4030_CORE, and disabling OF_IRQ, in order to exhibit the erronous behaviour (see config
entry in the left part).
Bug fix location (fixed). We analyze the fixing commit to establish whether the source of the bug is in the code, in the
feature model, or in the mapping. Understanding this can help direct future research on building diagnostics tools: are
tools needed for analyzing models, mappings, or code? Where is it best to report an error?
The bug of Fig. 4 has been fixed both in the model and in the mapping (cf. Fig. 5). The fixing commit asserts that:
first, TWL4030_CORE should not depend on IRQ_DOMAIN (fixed in the model), and, second, that the assignment of
the variable ops to &irq_domain_simple_ops is part of the IRQ_DOMAIN code and not of OF_IRQ (fixed in
the mapping).
Error trace (trace). We manually analyze the execution trace that leads to the error state. Slicing tools cannot easily
be used for these purpose, as none of them is able to handle static preprocessor directives appropriately. Constructing a
trace allows us to understand the nature and complexity of the bug. A documented failing trace allows other researchers
to understand a bug much faster.
There are two types of entries in our traces: function calls and statements. Function call entries can be either static
(tagged call), or dynamic (dyn-call) if the function is called via a function pointer. A statement entry highlights
relevant changes in the program state. Every entry starts with a non-empty sequence of dots indicating the nesting
of function calls, followed by the location of the function definition (file and line) or statement (only the line). The
statement in which the error is manifested is marked with an ERROR label.
In Fig. 4(a) the trace starts in the driver loading function (twl_probe). This is called from i2c_device_-
probe at drivers/i2c/i2c-core.c, the generic loading function for I2C8 drivers, through a function pointer
(driver->probe). A call to irq_domain_add passes the globally-declared struct domain by reference, and the
ops field of this struct, now aliased as *d, is dereferenced (d->ops->to_irq).
The ops field of domain is not explicitly initialized, so it has been set to null by default (as dictated by the C
standard). Thus the above error trace unambiguously identifies a path from the loading of the driver to a null-pointer
dereference, when OF_IRQ is disabled. Had OF_IRQ been enabled, the ops field would have been properly initialized
prior to the call to irq_domain_add.
Simplified Bug. Last but not least, we synthesize a simplified version of the bug capturing its most essential properties.
We write a small C99 program, independent of the kernel code, that exhibits the same essential behavior (and the same
8A serial bus protocol used in micro controller applications.
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problem). The obtained simplified bugs are easily accessible for researchers willing to try program verification and
analysis tools without integrating with the Linux build infrastructure, huge header files and dependent libraries, and,
most importantly, without understanding the inner workings of the kernel. Furthermore, the entire set of simplified
bugs constitute an easily accessible benchmark suite derived from real bugs occurring in a large-scale software system,
which can be used to evaluate bug finding tools in a smaller scale.
Simplified bugs are derived systematically from the error trace. Along this trace, we preserve relevant statements and
control-flow constructs, mapping information and function calls. We keep the original identifiers for features, functions
and variables. However, we abstract away dynamic dispatching via function pointers, struct types, void pointers, casts,
and any Linux-specific type, when this is not relevant for the bug. When there exist dependencies between features, we
force valid configurations with #define. This encoding of feature dependencies has the advantage of making the
simplified bug files self-contained.
Figure 4(b) shows the simplified version of our running example bug with null pointer dereference. Lines 2–4 encode
a dependency of TWL4030_CORE on IRQ_DOMAIN , in order to prevent the invalid configuration TWL4030_CORE∧
¬IRQ_DOMAIN . We encourage the reader to study the execution trace leading to a crash by starting from main at line
20. This takes a mere few minutes, as opposed to many hours necessary to obtain an understanding of a Linux kernel
bug normally. Note that the trace is to be interpreted under the presence condition from the bug record (decisions are
specified in comments next to the #if conditionals).
Traceability information. We store the URL of the repository, in which the bug fix is applied, the commit hash, and
links to relevant context information about the bug, in order to support independent verification of our analysis.
5 Data Analysis
In order to address the research questions, we have reflected on the entire body of information gathered, arriving at
detailed observations presented below. In the following, we sometimes aggregate data with numbers. The numbers are
used solely for descriptive purposes—no statistical conclusions should be drawn from them (we emphasize this using a
gray font).
We start by presenting the observations that support our first research question, RQ1:
OBSERVATION 1: Variability bugs are not limited to any particular type of bugs.
Table 1 lists the type of bugs we found, along with occurrence frequencies in the collection. For example, 15 bugs
have been classified under the category of memory errors, four of which are null pointer dereferences. We note that
variability bugs cover a wide range of qualitatively different types of bugs from type errors, through data-flow errors
such as uninitialized variables, to locking policy violations (double locks).
We found 15 bugs, type errors and compiler warnings, caught by the compiler at build time. Despite the compiler
checks, the bugs had been admitted to the repository in the first place. Since compiler errors cannot easily be ignored,
we take this as evidence that the author of the commit (and the maintainer who accepted it) could not find the bug,
because they compiled the code in configurations that do not exhibit it (compiler checks are not family-based).
OBSERVATION 2: Variability bugs appear to not be restricted to specific “error prone” features.
Table 2 shows the complete list of features involved in the bugs: a total of 74 qualitatively different features, ranging from
debugging options (e.g., QUOTA_DEBUG and LOCKDEP), to device drivers (e.g., TWL4030_CORE and ANDROID),
to network protocols (e.g., VLAN_8021Q and IPV6), to computer architectures (e.g., PARISC and 64BIT). Three
features are involved in three of the bugs, 10 features occur in two bugs, and the remaining 61 are involved in only a
single bug.
OBSERVATION 3: Variability bugs are not confined to any specific location (file or kernel subsystem).
Figure 6 shows in which subsystems the bugs are located and the relative size of each subsystem as of March 2014 —we
approximate subsystems by directories. The size of each subsystem is measured in lines of code (LOC), we take the
sum of LOC (for any language) as reported by CLOC9 (version 1.53). E.g., with six squares, the kernel/ subsystem
has approximately 150 KLOC and represents about 1% of the Linux code. Superimposed onto the size visualization,
9http://cloc.sourceforge.net/
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the figure also shows in which directories the bugs occur. With five red (dark) squares, the directory kernel/ thus
houses five of the bugs of our collection.
We found bugs in ten of the main Linux subsystems, showing that variability bugs are not confined to any
specific subsystem. These are qualitatively different subsystems of Linux ranging from networking (net/), to device
drivers (drivers/, block/), to filesystems (fs/) or encryption (crypto/). Note that Linux subsystems are often
maintained and developed by different people, which adds to diversity of our collection.
We found no bug in ten directories, representing less than the 3% of the Linux kernel code in total. Further, three
of them (tools/, scripts/, and samples/) contain example and support code (build infrastructure, diagnostic
tools, etc.) that does not run on a compiled kernel.
We are now ready to answer RQ1:
CONCLUSION 1: Variability bugs are indeed not confined to any particular type of bug, error-prone
feature, or location in the Linux kernel.
We have found variability bugs falling in 19 different types of semantic errors, involving 74 qualitatively different
features, and located in 10 major subsystems of the Linux kernel.
We now turn to evidence regarding research question RQ2:
OBSERVATION 4: We have identified 29 bugs that involve non-locally defined features; i.e., features that
are “remotely” defined in another subsystem than where the bug occurred.
Understanding such bugs involves functionality and features from different subsystems, while most Linux developers
are dedicated to a single subsystem. For example, bug6252547b8a7 (Fig. 4) occurs in the drivers/ subsystem,
but one of the interacting features, IRQ_DOMAIN , is defined in kernel/. Bug0dc77b6dabe, which occurs in the
loading function of the extcon-class module (drivers/), is caused by an improper use of the sysfs virtual filesystem
Table 1: Types of bugs among the 40 bugs. The first column gives the frequency of these bugs in our collection.
15 memory errors: CWE ID
4 null pointer dereference 476
3 buffer overflow 120
3 read out of bounds 125
2 insufficient memory -
1 memory leak 401
1 use after free 416
1 write on read only -
8 compiler warnings: CWE ID
5 uninitialized variable 457
1 unused function (dead code) 561
1 unused variable 563
1 void pointer dereference -
7 type errors: CWE ID
5 undefined symbol -
1 undeclared identifier -
1 wrong number of args to function -
7 assertion violations: CWE ID
5 fatal assertion violation 617
2 non-fatal assertion violation 617
2 API violations: CWE ID
1 Linux sysfs API violation -
1 double lock 764
1 arithmetic errors: CWE ID
1 numeric truncation 197
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drivers/
7.0M(59%)
arch/
2.0M(17%)
fs/
801k(7%)
sound/
595k(5%)
net/
583k(5%)
include/
372k(3%)
kernel/
139k(1%)
lib/
66k(.6%)
mm/
63k(.5%)
crypto/
62k(.5%)
security/
49k(.4%)
block/
21k(.2%)Smaller:
• virt/ (6.8k), ipc/ (6.4k), init/ (2.0k), and usr/ (0.6k).
Infrastructure:
• tools/ (102k), scripts/ (44k), and samples/ (2.1k).
Figure 6: Location of the 40 bugs in the main Linux directories as of March 2014. Each square represents 25 thousand
lines of code. The precise number of LOC and its percentage of the total is given below the squares. A red (dark) square
symbolizes the occurrence of one of the bugs.
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Figure 7: In which layer(s) are the bugs fixed.
API—feature SYSFS in fs/. We confirmed with a Linux developer that cross-cutting features constitute a frequent
source of bugs.
OBSERVATION 5: Variability can be implicit and even hidden in (alternative) configuration-dependent
macro, function, or type definitions specified in (potentially different) header files.
Hidden variability significantly complicates the identification of variability-related problems. For example, in bug
0988c4c7fb5, function vlan_hwaccel_do_receive is called if a VLAN-tagged network packed is received.
This function, however, has two different definitions depending on whether feature VLAN_8021Q is present or
not. Variants without VLAN_8021Q support are compiled with a mockup-implementation of this function that
unconditionally enters an error state. Another example is bug 0f8f8094d28 which can be regarded as a trivial out of
bounds access to an array, except that the length of the array (KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH+1) is architecture-dependent,
and only the PowerPC architectures, for a given virtual page size, are affected. Both vlan_hwaccel_do_receive
and KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH have alternative definitions at different locations.
OBSERVATION 6: Variability bugs are fixed not only in the code; some are fixed in the mapping, some are
fixed in the model, and some are fixed in a combination of these.
Table 2: Features involved in the bugs.
64BIT CRYPTO_TEST JFFS2_FS_WBUF_VERIFY PPC64 SHMEM TREE_RCU
ACPI_VIDEO DEVPTS_MULTIPLE_INSTANCES KGDB PPC_256K_PAGES SLAB TWL4030_CORE
ACPI_WMI DISCONTIGMEM KPROBES PREEMPT SLOB UNIX98_PTYS
ANDROID DRM_I915 KTIME_SCALAR PROC_PAGE_MONITOR SMP VLAN_8021Q
ARCH_OMAP2420 EP93XX_ETH LOCKDEP PROVE_LOCKING SND_FSI_AK4642 VORTEX
ARCH_OPAM3 EXTCON MACH_OMAP_H4 QUOTA_DEBUG SND_FSI_DA7210 X86
ARM_LPAE FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER=11 MODULE_UNLOAD RCU_CPU_STALL_INFO SSB_DRIVER_EXTIF X86_32
BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE HIGHMEM NETPOLL RCU_FAST_NO_HZ STUB_POULSBO XMON
BCM47XX HOTPLUG NUMA REISERFS_FS_SECURITY SYSFS ZONE_DMA
BDI_SWITCH I2C OF_IRQ S390 TCP_MD5SIG
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Figure 8: Numbers of features involved in a bug (feature-interaction degree).
Figure 7 shows whether the bugs in our sample were fixed in the code, mapping, or model. Even though we only
documented bugs that manifested in code, 13 bugs in our sample were fixed in the mapping, in the model, or in two
layers.
Examples of simple fixes in the mapping and in the model are commits 472a474c663 and 7c6048b7c83,
respectively. The former adds a new #ifndef to prevent a double call to APIC_init_uniprocessor—which is
not idempotent, while the latter modifies STUB_POULSBO’s KCONFIG entry to prevent a build error.
Bug-fix 6252547b8a7 (Fig. 5) removes a feature dependency (TWL4030_CORE no longer depends on IRQ_-
DOMAIN ) and changes the mapping to initialize the struct field ops when IRQ_DOMAIN (rather than OF_IRQ) is
enabled. An example of multiple fix in mapping and code is commit 63878acfafb, which removes the mapping of
some initialization code to feature PM (power management), and adds a function stub.
This stratification into code, mapping and model may obscure the cause of bugs, because an adequate analysis of a
bug requires understanding these three layers. Further, each layer involves different languages; in particular, for Linux:
the code is C, the mapping is expressed using both CPP and GNU MAKE, and the feature model is specified using
KCONFIG.
Presumably, this complexity may cause a developer to fix a bug in the wrong place. For instance, the dependency of
TWL4030_CORE on IRQ_DOMAIN removed by our bug-fix 6252547b8a7 was added by commit aeb5032b3f8.
Apparently aeb5032b3f8 introduced this dependency into the feature model to prevent a build error, so to fix a bug,
but this had undesirable side-effects. According to the message provided in commit 6252547b8a7, the correct fix to
the build error was to make a variable declaration conditional on the presence of feature IRQ_DOMAIN .
OBSERVATION 7: We have identified as many as 28 feature-interaction bugs in the Linux kernel.
We define the feature-interaction degree of a bug, or just degree of a bug, as the number of individual features occurring
in its presence condition. Intuitively, the degree of a bug indicates the number of features that have to interact so that
the bug occurs. A bug present in any valid configuration is a bug independent of features, or a 0-degree bug. Bugs
with a degree greater than zero are variability bugs, thus occurring in a nonempty strict subset of valid configurations.
Particularly, if the degree of a bug is greater than one, the bug is caused by the interaction of two or more features. A
software bug that arises as a result of feature interactions is referred to as a feature-interaction bug.
Feature-interaction bugs are inherently more complex because the number of variants to be considered is exponential
in the degree of the bug. Bug 6252547b8a7 (cf. Fig. 4(b)) is the result of a two-feature interaction. The code slice
containing the bug involves three different features, and represents four variants (corrected for the feature model), but
only one of the variants presents a bug. The ops pointer is dereferenced in variants with TWL4030_CORE enabled,
but it is not properly initialized unless OF_IRQ is enabled. A developer searching for this bug needs to either think of
each variant individually, or consider the combined effect of each feature on the value of the ops pointer. None of
these are easy to execute systematically even in a simplified scenario, and outright infeasible in practice, as confirmed
by a professional Linux developer.
Feature interactions can be extremely subtle when variability affects type definitions. Commit 51fd36f3fad
fixes a bug in the Linux high-resolution timers mechanism due to a numeric truncation error, that only happens in 32-bit
architectures not supporting the KTIME_SCALAR feature. In these particular configurations ktime_t is a struct with
two 32-bit fields, instead of a single 64-bit field, used to store the remaining number of nanoseconds to execute the
timer. The bug occurs on attempt to store some large 64-bit value in one of these 32-bit fields, causing a negative value
to be stored instead. Interestingly, one of the Linux developers we interviewed also mentioned the difficulty to optimize
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for cache-misses due to variability in the alignment of struct fields.
OBSERVATION 8: We have identified 12 bugs involving three or more features.
An example of a 3-degree bug is ae249b5fa27, caused by the interaction of DISCONTIGMEM (efficient handling
of discontiguous physical memory) support in PA-RISC architectures (feature PARISC), and the ability to monitor
memory utilization through the proc/ virtual filesystem (feature PROC_PAGE_MONITOR). We also found 5-degree
bugs such as commit 221ac329e93, caused by 32-bit PowerPC architectures not disabling kernel memory write-
protection when KPROBES is enabled—a dynamic debugging feature that requires modifying the kernel code at
runtime.
Figure 8 summarizes the degree of our bugs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first documented collection of
feature-interaction bugs in the operating systems domain. So far, most feature-interaction bugs have been identified,
documented, and published in telecommunication domain [11].
OBSERVATION 9: Presence conditions for variability bugs also involve disabled features.
Table 3 lists and groups the structure of the presence conditions for our sample. We observe two main classes of
bug presence conditions: some-enabled, where one or more features have to be enabled for the bug to occur; and
some-enabled-one-disabled, where the bug is present when enabling zero or more features and disabling exactly one
feature. We identified 19 bugs in some-enabled configurations, and another 19 bugs in some-enabled-one-disabled.
(Note that one of the presence conditions has the form, (a∨ a′)∧¬b, but, since it is implied by either a∧¬b or a′ ∧¬b,
we include it in the some-enabled-one-disabled class.)
Testing of highly configurable systems is often approached by testing one or more maximal configurations, in
which as many features as possible are enabled—in Linux this is done using the predefined configuration allyesconfig.
This strategy allows to find many bugs with some-enabled presence conditions simply by testing one single maximal
configuration. But, if negated features occur in practice as often as in our sample, then testing maximal configurations
only, will miss a significant amount of bugs.
In our experience, the implementation of features in Linux is crosscutting many code locations, and features code is
intermixed. As a result, disabling a feature can both add or delete code from another feature, and we expect negated
features to be often part of bugs presence conditions. Bug 6252547b8a7 (Fig. 4) is such an example. Disabling
OF_IRQ causes the null pointer dereference because this feature is responsible for initializing the ops struct field.
Another example is bug 60e233a5660, where the implementation of a function add_uevent_var, when feature
HOTPLUG is disabled, fails to preserve an invariant causing a buffer overflow.
OBSERVATION 10: Effective testing strategies exist for the observed bug presence conditions.
Given the observed patterns (some-enabled and some-enabled-one-disabled) in Tbl. 3, we can think of a better testing
strategy than maximal configuration testing. We propose a one-disabled configuration testing strategy, where we test
Table 3: The structure of the presence conditions (i.e., in which configurations the 40 bugs occur).
19 some-enabled:
6 a
7 a ∧ b
5 a ∧ b ∧ c
0 a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d
1 a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e
19 some-enabled-one-disabled:
4 ¬a
11 a ∧ ¬b one of which is: (a ∨ a′) ∧ ¬b
3 a ∧ b ∧ ¬c
0 a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ ¬d
1 a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ ¬e
2 other configurations:
1 ¬a ∧ ¬b
1 a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d ∧ ¬e
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configurations in which exactly one feature is disabled, corresponding to the formulas ∀g∈F: (∧f∈F\{g} f) ∧ ¬g.
Table 4 compares the two strategies, maximal configuration testing and one-disabled configuration testing. We also add
an entry for exhaustive testing of all configurations, serving as a baseline (the cost is exponential there).
Maximal configuration testing has constant cost—ideally only one configuration has to be tested, and thus scales to
program families with an arbitrarily large number of features (F). It appears to be a fairly good heuristic: 48% of bugs
in our sample, 19 out of 40, could be found this way. One-disabled configuration testing has a linear cost on |F|, thus it
is reasonably scalable, even for program families with thousands of features like Linux. Remarkably, the 95% of our
bugs, 38 out of 40, could be found by testing the |F| one-disabled configurations. Note that these configurations also
find the bugs with a some-enabled presence condition (except for hypothetical cases requiring all features enabled).
In practice, we must consider the effect of the feature model in the testing strategy. Due to mutually exclusive
dependencies between features there is often no maximal configuration, but many locally maximal configurations.
Also, because some features depend on others to be present, we often cannot disable features individually. The
practical consideration of having a feature model is that enumerating the configurations to test requires selecting
valid configurations only, which is a NP-complete problem itself. Yet, we expect that enumerating valid one-disabled
configurations would be tractable, given the scalability of modern SAT solvers (hundreds of thousands of variables and
clauses) and the size of real-world program families (only thousands of features).
Our overall conclusion regarding RQ2 is:
CONCLUSION 2: Variability significantly increases the complexity of bugs.
Our analysis indicates that variability affects the complexity of bugs along several dimensions. Let us summarize them:
– A number of n features gives rise to up to 2n variants that the developer needs to consider;
– The implementation of features is intermixed and undesired interactions can easily occur, for instance, through
program variables;
– Interactions can occur between features from different subsystems, demanding cross-subsystem knowledge from
Linux developers;
– Variability can be implicit and even hidden in alternative macro, function, and type definitions specified at
different locations;
– Variability bugs may be the result of errors in the code, in the mapping, in the feature model, or any combination
thereof;
– Further, each of these layers involves different languages (C, CPP, GNU MAKE and KCONFIG);
– Not all these bugs will be detected by maximal configuration testing due to interactions with disabled features;
– The existence of compiler errors in the Linux tree shows that conventional feature-insensitive tools are not enough
to find variability bugs.
6 Threats to Validity
6.1 Internal Validity
Bias due to selection process. As we extract bugs from commits, our collection is biased towards bugs that were found,
reported, and fixed. Since users run a small subset of possible Linux configurations and developers lack feature-sensitive
Table 4: Maximal vs one-disabled configuration testing. The cost is the number of configurations satisfying the formula,
disregarding the feature model. Benefit shown as bug coverage for our sample.
test formula(s) cost benefit∧
f∈F f O(1) 48% (19/40)
∀g∈F: (∧f∈F\{g} f) ∧ ¬g O(|F|) 95% (38/40)
ψ O(2|F|) 100% (40/40)
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tools, potentially only a subset of bugs is found.
Further, our keyword-based search relies on the competence of Linux developers to properly identify and report
variability in bugs. Note, however, that in Linux, variability is ubiquitous and often “hidden”. For instance, the ath3k
bluetooth driver module file contains no explicit variability, yet after variability-preserving preprocessing and macro
expansion we can count thousands of CPP conditionals involving roughly 400 features. It is then unlikely that developers
are always aware of the variability nature of the bugs they fix.
In order to further minimize the risk of introducing false positives, we do not record bugs if we fail to extract a
sensible error trace, or if we cannot make sense of the pointers given by the commit author. This may introduce bias
towards reproducible and lower complexity bugs.
Because of inherent bias of a detailed qualitative analysis method, we are not able to make quantitative observations
about bug frequencies and properties of the entire population of bugs in the Linux kernel. Note, however, that we are
able to make qualitative observations such as the existential confirmation of certain kinds of bugs (cf. Sect. 5). Since we
only make such observations, we do not need to mitigate this threat (interestingly though, our collection still exhibits
very wide diversity as shown in Sect. 5).
False positives and overall correctness. By only considering variability bugs that have been identified and fixed by
Linux developers, we mitigate the risk of introducing false positives. We only take bug-fixing commits from the Linux
stable branch, the commits of which have been reviewed by other developers and, particularly, by a more experienced
Linux maintainer. The risk is not zero though, for instance, commit b1cc4c55c69 adds a nullity check for a pointer
that is guaranteed not to be null10. It is tempting to think that the above indicates a variability bug, while in fact it is just
a conservative check to detect a potential bug.
The manual analysis of a bug to extract an error trace is also error prone, especially for a language like C and a
complex large system such as Linux. Ideally, we should support our manual analysis with feature-sensitive program
slicing, if it existed. A more automated approach based on bug-finders would not be satisfactory. Bug-finders are built
for certain classes of errors, so they can give good statistical coverage for their particular class of errors, but they would
not be able to assess the diversity of bugs that appear.
We derive simplified bugs based on manual slicing, filtering out irrelevant statements. We also abstract away C
language features such as structs and dynamic dispatching via function pointers. While the process is systematic, it is
performed manually and consequently error prone.
6.2 External Validity
Small number of bugs. The size of our sample speaks against the generalizability of the observations. The process of
collecting and especially analyzing these 40 bugs costed several man-months, being unfeasible the study of a larger
number of bugs. We expect that our database will continue to grow, also from third-party contributions, in the near
future.
Single-subject study. We decided to focus exclusively on Linux, so our findings do not readily generalize to other
highly configurable software. Yet, the size and nature of Linux make it a fair worst-case representative of software
with variability. The type of bugs we found, especially memory errors, are the expected in any piece of configurable C
software. Also the significance of the Linux kernel project itself, justifies investigation of its errors, even if it limits
generalizability.
7 Related Work
Bug databases. ClabureDB is a database of bug-reports for the Linux kernel that serves a similar purpose as ours [30].
ClabureDB ignores variability, whereas we classify bugs according to their variability characteristics. The second
major difference is in the level of detail used to describe each bug. We provide, not only an error classification, but a
record with information enabling non Linux experts to rapidly understand the bugs and benchmark their analyses. A
10https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/10/15/30
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key ingredient for this is a simplified C99 version of each bug were irrelevant details are abstracted away, along with
explanations and references intended for researchers with limited experience with the Linux kernel. The main strength
of ClabureDB is its size, enabled by the use of bug finders for populating the database. In contrast, we analyzed bugs
manually based on developer-confirmed bugs from bug-fixing commits and hence free from false-positives. There exist
no bug finder that can be used to uncover bugs induced by feature interactions in a system like the Linux kernel, so
none of our bugs is covered in ClabureDB adequately.
Mining variability bugs. Nadi et al. mined commits from the Linux GIT repository to understand the nature of variability
anomalies in the Linux kernel [27]. An anomaly refers to errors in the mapping, which can be automatically detected by
checking the satisfiability of propositional constraints over features, such as incorrect mapping of code to an invalid
feature combination, or code mapped to nonexistent features. While we conduct our study in a similar way, we focus on
a much broader class of semantic errors in code, including data- and control-flow bugs.
Apel and coauthors used a model-checker to automatically find feature interactions in a simple email client [3].
They rely on a technique known as variability encoding (configuration lifting [29]), in which features are encoded as
Boolean variables and conditional compilation directives are transformed into regular conditional statements. The
resulting variability-encoded “meta-program” is then fed to a model-checker. Our focus, however, is not on identifying
feature interactions in the Linux kernel, but on understanding nature of variability bugs widely. This cannot be done
with a model-checker searching for a particular class of interactions. In fact, understanding variability bugs should lead
us to building bug finders that would scale to the kernel, enabling studies like [3] to be run for Linux in the future.
Medeiros et al. have studied syntactic variability errors [25]. They investigated releases in 41 families, and thousands
of individual commits in 8 families, all much smaller than Linux. Since they focus exclusively on syntax errors, they
are able to use a variability-aware C parser [23] to automate their bug finding and exhaustively find all syntax errors.
Despite the size of their sample, they found only few tens of errors, suggesting that syntactic variability errors are rare
in committed code. We focus on the wider category of much more complex semantic errors.
Nadi et al. present a method to mine feature dependencies in preprocessor-based program families. Their aim is to
semi-automate the process of documenting the feature model for an existing codebase [26]. They infer dependencies
using heuristics based on the nesting of CPP conditionals and three kinds of variability errors (parse-, type-, and
link-errors), relying on the assumption that a configuration that does not build correctly is not a valid configuration.
Again, our study considers a much wider class of errors than cannot be detected automatically at the moment.
Methodologically related work. Tian et al. studied the problem of distinguishing bug fixing commits in the Linux kernel
source code repository [33]. They propose to use semi-supervised machine learning to classify commits according to
tokens in the commit log along with code metrics extracted from the patch contents. Compared to previous keyword-
based methods, they significantly improve recall (while precision remains the same). However, when building a
benchmark suite, the main concern is to eliminate false positives to reduce human workload. We found our regular
expression-based search method precise enough for our purpose. Indeed, most of time was invested in analyzing specific
commits, not in finding potential candidates.
Yin et al. built a collection of hundreds of errors caused by misconfigurations in open source and commercial
software [35]. Their goal is to offer a set of representative errors in large-scale software systems. They considers
systems in which program parameters are read from configuration files, as opposed to systems configured with features.
More importantly, they document errors from the user perspective, as opposed to our programmer perspective.
Padioleau et al. studied collateral evolution of the Linux kernel, following a method which is close to ours [28].
(Collateral evolution is when existing code is adapted to changes in the kernel interfaces.) They followed a similar
process, but had a different objective. They identified potential collateral evolution candidates by analyzing patch fixes,
and then manually selected 72 for a more careful analysis. Also, like us, they classify and perform an in-depth analysis
of their data.
8 Conclusion
We have found 40 variability bugs, 28 of which are feature-interaction bugs, by mining bug-fixing commits from the
Linux repository. We analyzed their cause-effect relation and variability properties, and documented the outcome into a
collection of bug records. Additionally, we have condensed each of these bugs into a self-contained simplified C99
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version of the bug, that keeps intact its variability properties. Simplified bugs help understanding the real bug, but also
constitute a benchmark suite, systematically derived from real bugs in Linux, that can be used for preliminary tool
evaluation.
We conclude, first, that variability bugs are not confined to any particular type of bug, error-prone feature, or source
code location (file, or subsystem) of the Linux kernel. Second, that variability increases the complexity of bugs in Linux
in several ways, remarkably: a) Variability adds an exponential number of variants to be considered; b) Variability can
be hidden and thus difficult to identify by developers; c) The implementation of features is intermixed and undesired
interactions can occur easily; d) These interactions can happen between features from different subsystems; e) Bugs can
be traced back to the code, the mapping, the feature model, or any combination thereof. Commits with compile-time
errors pushed to the Linux tree repository constitute evidence for this conclusion. We also get this confirmation from a
professional Linux developer.
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